Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
267 SCRA 402
February 1997 En Banc
FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.

One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

Marbury vs. Madison

Marbury vs. Madison
5 US (Cranch) 137
February 1803
FACTS:

Petitioner William Marbury was appointed Justice of the Peace for the county if Washington in the District of Columbia by then President John Adams of the US shortly before the latter vacated his Office. However, Adams' Secretary of State, John Marshall, failed to deliver to Marbury the latter's duly signed and sealed commission documents, without which the petitioner cannot undertake his office as Justice of the Peace.

When Thomas Jefferson assumed presidency, his new Secretary of State, herein respondent James Madison, continued to withhold the said commission document from Marbury. Hence, this petition for mandamus was filed to the US Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission document top Marbury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the same Court has jurisdiction to issue the mandamus, given the circumstances of the case

COURT RULING:

The US Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, denied Marbury's petition for mandamus on the argument that the said Court has no jurisdiction on the case, and that the law on which Marbury based the said petition is unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and shall have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. In the case at bar, the Court made it clear that Marbury had already attained the five year legal right ti the commission because of the fact that the commission document has been completed the moment it was officially sealed, obliterating any doubt as to the authenticity of the signature affixed by the US President himself. However, Marbury failed to show that the mandamus he prays for is an exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction, which led to the denial of his petition.

"It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed ot courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer to deliver a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original jurisdiction, Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction"

Another general rule is that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. The Courts, as well as other departments, are bound by the instrument, as repeatedly emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall. He further reiterated that the written Constitution should be upheld and protected at all times, and that the Court has a duty to ensure that such reverence is given to the written Constitution. It must remain above all laws.

The power of the legislative department to create laws cannot ever exceed the written Constitution which itself is the source of such power. The power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that Court in other cases; provided those cases belong to the jurisdictional power of the US. As to the power of the President over the officer whom he appoints, it is limited by the written Constitution and is deemed completed the moment he affixed his signature unto the commission document and "to withhold the commission x x x is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law but violative of a vested right."

The action for mandamus in this case filed by the petitioner is in excess of the Court's jurisdiction, and any law enacted by the legislature which diminish or increase the Court's jurisdiction without the Court's prior consent is unconstitutional and must be discharged.

Marcos vs. Manglapus

G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

FACTS:

On February 1986, President Ferdinand E Marcos was deposed from presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced in to exile together with his family members.

President Cory Aquino was declared President of the Republic of the Philippines under a revolutionary government but her government was not free from threats. There were the different coup attempts headed by either the loyalist of the former president like Col. Canlas, or by rebel soldiers like Gringo Honasan. The forces of the NPA had not been uprooted. They also pose a considerable threat to the government.

Moreover, the economy of the country is still devastated and the efforts for economic recovery have yet to show concrete results, while the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has not been recovered.

Now, Mr. Marcos petition the court to return to the Philippines to die in his homeland. Considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when stability of the government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear.